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Abstract. Within a virtual organization, more than one institution might be in-
volved in the regulation of actors’ behavior. Each institution specifies a set of
norms covering a specific aspect of the problem domain with a governance scope
defining its remit. Together, they govern the participants and reflect the objec-
tives of the organization. With actors’ behavior being simultaneously regulat-
ed by more than one institution, normative conflicts can appear. In this paper,
we formalize the notion of governance scope and propose a computational ap-
proach to identify weak and strong norm conflicts in virtual organizations. This
is achieved by explicitly modeling the governance scopes of institutions through
context models. We illustrate our approach by means of a case study concerning
food security in international trade.
1 Introduction
Virtual organizations (VOs) [11] can employ various institutions to cover different as-
pects of regulating the behaviour of the participating actors in order to achieve the VO’s
goals. The norms that make up an institution inherently serve to restrict its applicabil-
ity, but the variables, in terms of which those norms are expressed, are also typically
intended to be restricted to specific, meaningful ranges within the domain being mod-
elled. That is to say, some combinations of event and metadata are meaningful and
others are not. We use the term governance scope to describe this set of concrete ob-
servable/exogenous events and associated values (event metadata) that can affect the
state of an institution and hence characterize the situations (being particular combina-
tions of contextual information such as time, location, weather, relations, and system
states) in which a given institution has competence.
When an event occurs, several institutions might respond to regulate the behaviour.
Regardless of the outcome of the individual regulation processes, we call this situa-
tion a governance overlap. The activation of multiple institutions can cause problems,
in that a single event might be interpreted differently and could result in conflicting
consequences. For example, when a Dutch citizen applies for a visa to the US, sever-
al institutions might be triggered, e.g., US embassy, Dutch government, and a conflict
could exist between information requirements from the US embassy and privacy poli-
cies from the Dutch government. We contend that in VOs governed by multiple institu-
tions, the existence of normative conflicts cannot be avoided just by defining mutually
exclusive deontic expressions, since that would preclude any institutionally common
event. Clearly, careful definition of institutional competence is needed and its overlap
between different institutions is a necessary precondition for norm conflicts in VOs.
Consequently, we regard the process of designing an institution as not only the defini-
tion of a set of norms but also the characterization of its governance scope, i.e., what
kinds of situations are under control of the institution, since this is what gives the in-
stitution its ‘footprint’. That is, the same set of norms with different governance scopes
results in different contextualized institutions. Furthermore, the occurrence of external
events, that fall within the governance scope of an institution, initiates state transitions
for that institution. In this way, different sets of norms in the VO are activated to regulate
behaviour.
This paper introduces an approach that: (i) formalizes the governance scope of an
institution through context models and hence captures the relations between institutions,
and (ii) provides a mechanism to analyze institutional governance scope, as a precursor
to detecting norm conflicts. We operationalize our approach by adapting an existing
computational model, which we then use to demonstrate how our proposal works using
a case study.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a
simplified scenario concerning food security from the domain of international trade.
In Section 3, we introduce the formal model of the contextualized institution. In sec-
tion 4, we discuss the relations between contextualized institutions in VOs and define
two categories of norm conflict. Section 5 presents an operational model of contextu-
alized institutions, which is then used to identify norm conflicts through a case study
in Section 6. Related work is discussed in Section 8. Finally, we conclude and identify
directions for future work in Section 9.
2 Scenario
The World Customs Organization (WCO) has defined a framework called the Autho-
rized Economic Operator (AEO) program [1] in order to address the tensions created
by the simultaneous growth in international trade and requirements for increased se-
curity. The European Communities’ implementation of AEO permits various customs
administrations to grant AEO certificates to qualified companies under which they enjoy
special privileges. Taking the scenario of importing food from a country outside the EU
to the Netherlands, a number of governmental authorities and companies are involved,
which together form a virtual organization. Such a virtual organization is governed by
different sets of regulations concerning different aspects of the food importation pro-
cess. For example, the EU has a set of general regulations in which one is that the food
authority is obliged to carry out a food quality inspection. With the introduction of the
AEO programme, the Dutch government introduced new regulations for the specific do-
main of AEO-certified goods in order to improve trading efficiency. For example, one
regulation is that a food authority is forbidden to carry out a food quality inspection, if
customs has already done so. Additionally, companies such as container terminals play
an important role and bring their own regulations, e.g., a regulation at one container
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Fig. 1. Governance scopes in virtual organization.
unloading. Given these different sets of regulations, it is essential to capture not only
their individual functionalities but also their interrelations concerning the governance
of real world events.
3 Formal Model
The virtual organization in Figure 1 has three parts: (i) external events observed in the
real world, each of which has associated contextual information (ii) institutions com-
prising sets of norms, in which constitutive norms translate external events into insti-
tutional events which are further mapped to institutional states, and regulative norms
(permissions, obligations, prohibitions) react to the occurrence of institutional events
and states, and (iii) governance scopes that delineate the control boundary of institu-
tions through a set of contextual dimensions. With governance scopes, contextualized
institutions are built, which facilitates the identification of applicable institutions for a
given event. We now explain each of these components in more detail.
To capture the contextual information of events and the governance scope of insti-
tutions, we introduce the concept of contextual dimension.
Definition 1 (Contextual Dimension). A contextual dimension Di, i ∈ {1, . . ., n} is
a situational variable whose values are from a value set Vi comprising a set of atomic
values.
Contextual dimensions concern, but are not restricted to, aspects such as individuality,
activity, time, location, and relation [17]. The values of each contextual dimension are
assumed to come from some structured domain. For example, we can have a contextual
dimension of Di = Location with a value set Vi = {NL, France,Germany, ...}.
3.1 Events
We differentiate two kinds of events. One is external events observed in reality and
the other is institutional events defined by institutions, which serve as the triggers of
institutional evolution. A basic element of an event is an action and other contextual in-
formation, such as who, when and where the action is performed, can also be included
to refine the occurrence of the event. Therefore, we define an event as an action asso-
ciated with a set of contextual elements, which permits us to correlate events with the
customized contextual dimensions of governance scopes.
Definition 2 (Event). An event e is a tuple 〈action, c〉 where
– action indicates the fact or process of doing something,
– c ∈ ∏
i
Vi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} characterizes the situation where the event occurs, with
respect to a flexible set of contextual dimensions.
The contextual dimensions that are used to characterize the occurrence of an event is not
fixed, i.e., c can relate to an arbitrary set of contextual dimensions. For example, given
two dimensions {Location, Time}, an event could be e = 〈eat, 〈McDonald’s, 12pm〉〉,
indicating that the action of eating occurs at the time of 12pm and at the location of
McDonald’s.
3.2 Governance Scope
Governance scopes are used to delineate the control boundary of institutions, deter-
mining which situations are under their control. To capture the governance scope of an
institution, we adopt the context model proposed by Giunchiglia and Bouquet [8]. The
model is based on three elements: a set of parameters, a value for each parameter, and
a state of affairs or a domain, which draws a sort of boundary between what is in and
what is out.
Correspondingly, we characterize a governance scope as a set of contextual dimen-
sions. Different contextual dimensions indicate different ways of establishing the gov-
ernance scope of an institution. For example, an institution can specify its governance
scope by defining a contextual dimension of Individuality, indicating that as long as the
entities evolved in an event belongs to a set of individuals, the institution has the right
to govern the behaviour. Similarly for Location, an institution can indicate that as long
as the observed location of an event belongs to a set of locations, the behaviour is in the
governance scope of the institution.
Definition 3 (Governance Scope). A governance scope gs is a tuple 〈 Action, C 〉
where
– Action is a set of actions,
– C ∈∏
i
2Vi , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, relating to a flexible set of contextual dimensions.
It can be seen that gs specifies a multi-dimensional space by assigning each contextual
dimension a set of values it accepts. Note that we separate the set of actions from the
contextual dimensions only to match the definition of event. A governance scope might
have no constraint on a particular contextual dimension. In this case, a value of universal
set denoted as U is assigned to that dimension and we consider the governance scope
covers the whole value set of that contextual dimension. For example, a governance
scope could be 〈Action = {import, export}, 〈Location = {NL}, Time = U〉〉.
3.3 Institution Model
Following Searle’s notion of the construction of social reality [13], we differentiate two
kinds of institutional norms, i.e., constitutive norms and regulative norms. Constitutive
norms specify how an institution (and hence all of the members of the society associated
with it) should interpret the events happened in reality, while regulative norms are used
to regulate the behaviour of agents in terms of permissions, obligations and prohibitions.
Constitutive norms in our institution model are of two kinds. One is to translate
external events to institutional events, denoted by function fCA. The other is to derive
institutional states from institutional events subject to certain institutional states, ex-
pressed by function C. Adapted from [3], we use the concept of fluents F , i.e., a set of
facts, to characterize institutional states. Definition 4 gives the formalization.
Definition 4 (Constitutive Norm). A constitutive norm is defined as nc = 〈Eex, Einst〉|
〈Einst, Σi, Σi+1〉, constructed from two functions:
– institutional mapping function fCA : Eex → Einst which relates external events
Eex to institutional events Einst,
– institutional consequence function C : Einst × Σi → Σi+1 in which Σi, Σi+1 =
2F∪¬F respectively indicate the current and successor institutional states.
Predicated on institutional events and states, regulative norms specify a set of dos
and don’ts. Adapting the ADICO syntax proposed by Ostrom [12], we give the defini-
tion of a Regulative Norm.
Definition 5 (Regulative Norm). A regulative norm is defined as a tuple nr = 〈role,
deontic, action, condition, deadline〉 such that:
– role indicates the type of entities to whom the norm applies;
– deontic indicates the deontic type of the norm, i.e., Permitted, Obliged or Forbidden;
– action specifies the particular institutional action to which the deontic is assigned;
– condition is expressed as 〈Σ,E〉, where Σ describes the states under which the
norm holds and E is a sequence of events.
– deadline, expressed as an event, describes the latest time by which the norm (usu-
ally obligations) should be complied with otherwise a violation is generated.
From the definition, we can see that a regulative norm is a conditional deontic expres-
sion with a deadline, which indicates that when the condition is fulfilled, agents enacting
the role have a permission, obligation or prohibition to perform the action before the
deadline. If a regulative norm does not specify a particular role, the default value is for
all participants. Condition and deadline can also be empty, indicating the norm always
holds under any conditions. Obligations may be assigned a deadline event, i.e. the ac-
tion is obliged to perform before the deadline event occurs. In particular, obligations
and prohibitions may have corresponding sanctions when the norms are violated. Sanc-
tions are triggered when violations are detected. In this sense, the violation of certain
norms serve as the conditions of other norms about sanctions.
Roles specified in regulative norms are enacted by real world actors. When an exter-
nal event occurs, constitutive norms create a link between the actors in reality and the
roles they enact in an institution. In this sense, the identity information of actors cap-
tured in the contextual information of external events are linked to institutional roles.
As stated before, institutions are not only a set of norms but also characterized by
governance scopes which reflect their control boundaries. Therefore, we introduce the
definition of Contextualized Institution.
Definition 6 (Contextualized Institution). A contextualized Institution is defined as a
tuple I = 〈Σ0,F , gs, CN,RN〉, where
– Σ0 indicates the initial state of the institution,
– F is a set of facts, characterizing institutional states,
– gs is the governance scope of the institution,
– CN is a set of constitutive norms,
– RN is a set of regulative norms.
Each institution is assigned an initial state specifying where the institution starts.
Associated with a governance scope, an institution identifies all the situations that are
under its control. The set of constitutive norms CN , on the one hand, connects ex-
ternal events to the institution in the sense that external events counts-as institutional
events constrained by the governance scope, and on the other hand, drives institution-
al state evolution. Given the institutional events and states, the set of regulative norms
RN activates corresponding permissions, obligations and prohibitions so that the real
world behavior can be regulated. Given an external event, we first use the values of its
contextual dimensions to determine whether the event falls in the governance scope of
an institution. If so, the event will be (partially) translated to institutional events since
some of the contextual information might not be relevant for regulative norms and are
only needed for the determination of governance scopes.
Given sequences of events occurring in reality, institutions relate the effects to the
conditions of its regulative norms. In this way, institutions can respond to the real world
behavior by initiating and terminating some of the regulative norms. Details about the
dynamics of institutions will be explained in Section 5.
However, since regulative norms are based on institutional events, it is necessary
to trace back the originating external events when determining the behavior in the real
world that regulative norms refer to. Therefore, we defined Reverse CountsAs Function
as below:
Definition 7 (Reverse CountsAs Function f˜CA). Given an institutional event e′ and
a set of constitutive norms CN , f˜CA(e′) = {e|〈e, e′〉 ∈ CN}.
It can be seen that f˜CA maps the responses of the institution to the reality so that the
real world behavior can be addressed and hence governed.
4 Institutions in Virtual Organizations
Individual institutions are designed originally for their own objectives and thus have
specific governance scopes. As long as the institutions are internally consistent, they can
successfully operate independently. In virtual organizations, however, when interactions
are governed by multiple institutions, mutually exclusive norms might be provided from
the institutions with overlapping governance scope. Therefore, we aim to detect such
kind of conflicts in VOs.
4.1 Collective Institutions
Figure 2 shows how institutions evolve with a sequence of events occurred in a virtual
organization. At the initial stateΣ0, each institution of the virtual organization is initial-

























We can see that at different time instants, there are different sets of institutions acti-
vated by the same event. That is, the contextual information of an event simultaneously
maps to the governance scope of some institutions. To represent these simultaneously
activated institutions, we introduce the concept of Collective Institution Set in Defini-
tion 8.
Definition 8 (Collective Institution Set). In a virtual organization governed by a set of
institutions {I1, . . . , Im}, Ij = 〈Σj0,Fj , gsj , CNj , RNj〉, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, given an event
e occurred at time instant k, a collective institution set is defined as Vk = {Ij |actione ∈
Agsj , and ∀Di, piVi (ce) ∈ piVi (gsj), 1 ≤ j ≤ m} where piVi (ce) and piVi (gsj) respec-
tively indicate the value (values) that the event e and the governance scope gsj take for
the contextual dimension Di.
At any time instant k, the set of all institutions whose governance scope covers the
contextual information of the event that occurs at time k is called a collective institu-
tion set, indicating all the activated institutions given the occurrence of an event. The
governance scopes of these institutions overlap with each other and thus they all have
governance competence on the same event.
4.2 Governance Overlap
In a collective institution set, the overlap relation between governance scopes is indicat-
ed by the same substantive event covered by a set of institutions. Generally, the overlap
relation is determined by the values of each contextual dimension with respect to dif-
ferent governance scopes. To represent the overlap between the governance scopes of
different institutions, we introduce the concept of Governance Overlap.
Definition 9 (Governance Overlap). Given two governance scopes gs = 〈A,C〉,




If Ω(gs, gs′) 6= ∅, we say gs and gs′ have a non-empty overlap. Particularly, in a
collective institution set Vk = {I1, . . . , In}, ∀Ii ∈ Vk,∀Ij ∈ Vk, Ω(gsi, gsj) 6= ∅
4.3 Norm Conflicts
When an event simultaneously activates multiple institutions with overlapping gover-
nance scopes, these institutions should be consistent with each other. However, since the
individual institutions are designed originally for their own use, there might be conflict-
ing norms between them. The focus of this paper is on the conflicts between regulative
norms that are simultaneously applied to the same agent possibly enacting different
roles in different institutions, but associated with inconsistent deontic modalities. Defi-
nition 10 illustrates the concept of Norm Conflicts considered in this paper.
Definition 10 (Norm Conflict). Within a collective institution set Vk = {I1, . . ., In},
a norm conflict can be defined between any two institutions Ii, Ij ∈ Vk, Ii = 〈 Σi0, Fi,
gsi, CNi, RNi〉 and Ij = 〈Σj0 , Fj , gsj , CNj , RNj〉 iff
∃〈rolei, deontici, actioni, conditioni, deadlinei〉 ∈ RNi,
∃〈rolej , deonticj , actionj , conditionj , deadlinej〉 ∈ RNj , such that
– both conditioni and conditionj are fulfilled,
– neither deadlinei nor deadlinej has expired,
– f˜CA(e′i) ∩ f˜CA(e′j) 6= ∅ where e′i = 〈actioni, vi1, . . . , vim〉 ∈ E iinst,
e′j = 〈actionj , vj1, . . . , vjn〉 ∈ Ejinst,
– if deontici = P and deonticj = F , we term this conflict as a weak conflict,
– if deontici = O and deonticj = F , we term this conflict as a strong conflict,
As expressed in the definition, given any two institutions Ii and Ij within a collective
institution set, if their governance scopes overlap somehow and there are two norms
initiated by two institutions simultaneously, both of which refer to the same event in
reality, but associated with contradictory deontic modalities, we term this situation as a
norm conflict.
Specifically, we differentiate two kinds of norm conflicts, i.e., weak conflicts and
strong conflicts. A weak conflict is defined between a permission (P) and a prohibition
(F), which might lead to violation. That is, if the action specified in both of the norms
is performed, the prohibition is violated, while if not, there will not be any violation. A
strong conflict is defined between an obligation (O) and a prohibition (F), which must
lead to violation no matter the action specified in both of the norms is performed or
not. That is, if the specified action is performed, the prohibition is violated, while if not,
the obligation is violated. Therefore, weak conflicts might be avoided as long as the
specified actions are not performed, but strong conflicts cannot.
5 Operational Model
We adapt ideas from the institutional action language InstAL [3], to operationalize the
normative framework of Section 3. For each individual institution, the modeling pro-
cess defines an explicit governance scope and formalizes the norms (both constitutive
and regulative) for each institution. Subsequent translation into a computational model
allows users to verify the resulting institutional states against a sequence of external
events.
The computational model is implemented by Answer Set Programming (ASP) [7],
which is a declarative logic programming paradigm. AnsProlog is chosen here to be
the language because several efficient solvers exist for it. The fundamental elements of
AnsProlog are atoms assigned with truth values. Atoms can be negated by means of
negation as failure. A literal inAnsProlog is either an atom or a negated atom, and then
constitute rules of the general form : a : −b1, ..., bm, not c1, ..., not cn where a, bi and
not cj are all atoms. The rule can be read intuitively as if all atoms bi are known/true,
and no cj is known/true, then a must be known/true. Of the form, a is referred as the
head of the rule while bi and not cj are the body. Additionally, there are two special
forms of rules: facts which have no body part and constraints that have no head part.
Constraints are normally used to filter the results by specifying the undesirable features
of solutions to the problem. A normal answer set program is denoted by a conjunction of
rules. The results of the programs are represented by a set of answer sets. Each answer
set is a minimal and consistent set of atoms assigned with truth values satisfying all the
rules in the program and thus each answer set is a solution to the problem.
We build our operational model based on two basic elements fluents F and events
E . Fluents characterize institutional state, as a set of facts, and their presence denote
that some facts are true, and their absence indicate the facts are false. Consequently,
institutional states can be denoted by any combination of the fluents and their negated
forms. Events, both external and institutional, are defined as a tuple and encoded as
ev(a, v1, ...vn). For example, an event 〈transport, terminala, AEO beef〉 is encoded
as ev(trans, ta, abf).
Governance scope gs has been introduced to build contextualized institutions. As
defined in Section 3.2, the gs of an institution is represented as a tuple 〈Action,C〉. C
is indicated by a set of contextual dimensions, each of which defines the set of values
the contextual dimension can take with regard to this governance scope. Therefore, we
model the gs of an institution by a set of action(a) indicating the governed actions, and
a set of scope(i, v) describing the corresponding values for a specific dimension with
index i. In this way, the gs of an institution is explicitly defined by a multi-dimensional
space. In order to examine whether an external event is within the gs of an institution,
we assume that the event contains a full set of the contextual dimensions as defined in
gs and specified in the same order. Whether a gs covers an event e is determined by
comparing their attached value(s) regarding the same contextual dimension, and finally
yields governed(A, V1, ..., Vn) if the event is covered by gs.
Institutional state transitions are driven by the occurrence of external events Eex
starting from a specified initial state ∆. The evolution of institutional states is based
on both constitutive norms(CN ) and regulative norms (RN ): (i) CN interprets ob-
served external events Eex as institutional events Einst subjected to the governance
scope. Afterwards, the generated institutional events promote the transitions of insti-
tutional states. (ii) RN specifies norms at certain institutional states. If the conditions
are satisfied, norms about permissions, prohibitions and obligation are activated. While
the deadlines expire, the norms are deactivated.
s ∈ Σ ⇔ fluent(s).
e : 〈a, v1, ..., vn〉 ∈ Eex ⇔ ev(a, v1, ..., vn).
e′ : 〈ia, iv1, ..., ivn〉 ∈ Einst ⇔ ev(ia, iv1, ..., ivn).
gs = 〈A,R1, ..., Rn〉 ⇔ ∀a ∈ A, action(a). ∀v ∈ Ri, scope(i, v).
governed(A, V1, ..., Vn): − action(A),
scope(1, V1), ..., scope(n, Vn).
∀〈〈a, v1, ..., vn〉, 〈ia, iv1, ..., ivn〉〉 ∈ CN ⇔ occ(ev(ia, iv1, ..., ivn), T): − obs(ev(a, v1, ..., vn), T),
governed(a, v1, ..., vn).
countAs(ev(a, v1, ..., vn), ev(ia, iv1, ..., ivn), Inst), inst(Inst).
∀〈〈ia, iv1, ..., ivn〉, Σt, Σt+1〉 ∈ CN ⇔ holdsat(s, T+ 1) : − occ(ev(ia, iv1, ..., ivn), T),X (Σ,T ).
happened(ev(a, v1, ..., vn), T) : − obs(ev(a, v1, ..., vn), T).
happened(ev(ia, iv1, ..., ivn), T) : − occ(ev(ia, iv1, ..., ivn), T).
∀nr ∈ RN,nr = 〈r, perm, a, 〈Σ,E〉〉 ⇔ norm(perm(a, r), T) : − EX(Σ,T ),H(E, T ), action(a), role(r).
∀nr ∈ RN,nr = 〈r, forb, a, 〈Σ,E〉〉 ⇔ norm(forb(a, r), T) : − EX(Σ,T ),H(E, T ), action(a), role(r).
∀nr ∈ RN,nr = 〈r, obl, a, d, 〈Σ,E〉〉 ⇔ norm(obl(a, r), T): − EX(Σ,T ),H(E, T ), not happened(d, T),
action(a), role(r).
H(E, T ), ∀ei ∈ E ⇔ happened(ei, Ti), before(Ti, T).
X (Σ,T )⇔ ∀s ∈ Σ, holdsat(s, T). ∀s /∈ Σ, not holdsat(s, T).
EX(Σ,T ), ∀s ∈ Σ ⇔ holdsat(s, T).
s0 ∈ ∆⇔ holdsat(s0, 0).
Fig. 3. Operational Model in AnsProlog
In Figure 3, we illustrate the mapping from the formal model toAnsProlog literals.
The atoms fluent(s) and ev(a, v1, ..., vn) encode the fluents and events respectively.
To operationalize CN , firstly the corresponding institutional event is generated (occ)
by an external event (obs) if being covered by gs. At the same time, a literal countAs
is generated to reflect the generation relation between external entities and institutional
entities, including actions and other contextual entities carried with events. All the ob-
served and occurred events are considered as happened events happened(E, T). More-
over, CN also specifies the effects of institutional events. A state formula X (Σ,T )
denotes the institutional states at time T, which is expressed by a set of holdsat(s,
T) and not holdsat(s, T) . Regarding regulative norms RN , three literals are defined
to encode Permissions (norm(perm(a, r), T)), Prohibitions (norm(forb(a, r), T)) and
Obligations (norm(obl(a, r), T)), holding at time T . Certain conditions (EX(Σ,T ))
have to be satisfied at time T to activate a regulative norm, which requires a sequence
of happened events (H(E, T )). The fluents holding at the initial statesΣ0 are translated
into holdsat(s0, 0).
6 Case Study
To demonstrate our approach, we formalize a specific case from the scenario described
in Section 2. Based on the operational model, we further illustrate how to identify col-
lective institution sets and detect norm conflicts in the case study.
6.1 Modeling Contextualized Institution
In this case study, we mainly consider three institutions {I1, I2, I3}, whose governance
scopes are based on three contextual dimensions {Individuality, Location, Food}, and
a set of actions Action that are specified by the regulative norms of the institutions.
We use RNaction(Ii) to represent the set of actions that each institution defines in its
set of regulative norms. Individuality refers to agents participating in the case study
{ag, ag1}. Location is provided with a set of values {ta, tb, tc, wa} in which the first
three elements represent three container terminals and the fourth element represents a
warehouse. Food also has a corresponding value set {AEO beef, non-AEO beef}. Note
that in this paper we only consider parts of the value sets which are most relevant to our
analysis. Table 1 gives the details of the three institutions.
As mentioned in Section 3.2, contextual dimensions are used to define the gover-
nance scope of an institution. We next discuss how governance scope can be formalized
in our operational model. Each contextual dimension is encoded as a variable and the
corresponding range of values is specified by a set of facts scope and action. Fur-
thermore, the literal governed assures that the governance scope of an institution will
be bounded by all these scopes. As illustrated in Table 1, the three institutions share
three dimensions Individuality, Location and Food, which are constrained by different
sets of values. For example, I1 governs all European terminals and warehouses when
importing food to the EU countries. Therefore the scopes are initiated as ASP literals
for I1: scopeEU(1, ag; ag1), scopeEU(2, ta; tb; tc; wa), scopeEU(3, abf; nabf). I2
represents Dutch government, concerning importing AEO certified food via Dutch ter-
minals and warehouses, e.g. ta, tb, wa and AEO beef, while the terminal company I3
regulates all the food imports through terminal ta only. All corresponding literals are
defined and shown in Table 1. Different suffixes are attached with literal names to de-
note which institution the literal belongs to, e.g. scopeEU is for I1, scopeNL for I2 and
scopeTE for I3.
Table 1. Institution Model for the case study
gs CN RN
I1
〈RNaction(I1), 〈{ag,ag1}, transport food to EU O(food authority, inspect quality, after unloading),
{ta, tb, tc, wa}, counts as F(carrier, pass border, before inspection is finished),
{AEO beef, non-AEO
beef}〉〉
food passes border F(any food,choose inspection location)
scopeEU(1, ag; ag1). occ(ev(inPass, carr, ta, abf), T) norm(obl(inInspect, foodAuth), T)
scopeEU(2, ta; tb; tc; wa). :-obs(ev(trans, ag1, ta, abf), T), :-happened(ev(informLoc, ag, ta, abf), K),
scopeEU(3, abf; nabf). governedEU(ag1, ta, abf). not happened(ev(trans, ag1, ta, abf), T),
before(K, T), role(foodAuth).
I2
〈RNaction(I2), 〈{ag,ag1}, transport food to EU F(food authority, inspect quality, if customs did),
{ta, tb, wa}, counts as F(carrier, pass border, before inspection is finished),
{AEO beef}〉〉 food passes border P(AEO Food, choose inspection location)
scopeNL(1, ag; ag1). occ(ev(inPass, carr, wa, abf), T) norm(forb(inInspect, foodAuth), T)
scopeNL(2, ta; tb; wa). :-obs(ev(trans, ag1, wa, abf), T), :-happened(ev(inInspect, customs, wa, abf), K),
scopeNL(3, abf). governedNL(ag1, wa, abf). before(K, T),role(foodAuth; customs).
norm(perm(inChooseLoc, carr), T)
:-happened(ev(informLoc, ag, wa, abf), K),
role(carr), before(K, T).
I3
〈 RNaction(I3), transport food to EU O(carrier, leave terminal, in 2 days after unload),
〈{ag,ag1}, {ta}, counts as O(carrier, pay fine, if food does not leave terminal
{AEO beef, non-AEO
beef}〉〉
food leaves terminal after two days from unloading)
scopeTE(1, ag; ag1). occ(ev(inLeave, carr, ta, abf), T) norm(obl(inLeave, carr), T)
scopeTE(2, ta). :-obs(ev(trans, ag1, ta, abf), T), :-happened(ev(waitForInsp, ag1, ta, abf), K),
scopeTE(3, abf; nabf). governedTE(ag1, ta, abf). not happened(ev(deadline), T), before(K, T),
role(carr).
To operationalize the three institutions, we generate the computational model for
each individual institution based on the rules in Figure 3. Due to space limitation, on-
ly the most significant rules are included in Table 1. The EU commission I1 specifies
that transporting food to EU counts as passing the border, and food authorities are
obliged to inspect the food before it passes the border. The relevant ASP programs are
shown in Table 1. An external event is observed obs(ev(trans, ta, abf), T), which
then generates an institutional event occ(ev(inPass, ta, aeofood), T) for I1 if all
the dimensions are covered by the gs of I1. After informing the inspection location
happened(informLoc), the obligation norm(obl(inInspect, foodAuth), T) is acti-
vated before the deadline event trans happens. I2 formalizes a regulative norm that af-
ter customs inspect the food happened(inInspect(wa, abe- ef, customs)), food au-
thorities are forbidden to inspect again norm (forb(inInspect, foodAuth), T), while
the permission for passing border is granted. Besides, I2 permits carriers to choose in-
spection location when importing AEO food norm(perm(inChooseLoc, carr), T). I3
only considers those external events ev(trans, ta, abf) within its governance scope,
which then trigger the institutional event leaving the terminal ev(inLeave, ta, abf).
The obligation of leaving the terminal norm(obl(inLeave, carr), T) before a deadline
is issued for all the food waiting for inspection at terminal ta.
6.2 Identification of Collective Institution Sets
As defined in section 4.3, conflicts are detected between institutions in a collective
institution set. That is, given an external event, all institutions within the set can in-
terpret the event (i.e. the event is covered by the gs of the institutions) and therefore
are activated. The literal governed/3 defined for each institution is used to examine
whether all contextual values carried with the event are covered by the gs of an insti-
tution. For example, if an event ev(inspect, ag, wa, abf) is observed at time T and
covered by the gs of I2, then inst2 is added into the collective institution set at time
T , collectiveInstSet(inst2, T). The corresponding ASP rules are as follows:
collectiveInstSet(inst2, T) : −
obs(ev(inspect, ag, wa, abf), T),
governedNL(ag, wa, abf).
6.3 Conflict Detection Mechanism
In this section, we present the computational mechanism for detecting norm conflicts
between institutions. Because we modelled each institution by AnsProlog , the same
technology can be adopted to detect norm conflicts between them. On the one hand, we
can generate all the possible observed event traces to determine which traces will lead
to conflicts. On the other hand, an deliberate event trace can be provided to test whether
it would lead to any conflicts at any time instant. The ASP programs for detecting weak
and strong conflicts are respectively shown as follows:
%% weak conflict
weakConflict(perm(AX, RX, InstX), forb(AY, RY, InstY), T) : −
norm(perm(AX, RX), T), norm(forb(AY, RY), T),
countAs(ev(A, V1, .., Vn), ev(AX, VX1, ..., VXn), InstX),
countAs(ev(A, V1, .., Vn), ev(AY, VY1, ..., VYn), InstY),
collectiveInstSet(InstX; InstY, T).
%% strong conflict
strongConflict(obl(AX, RX, InstX), forb(AY, RY, InstY), T) : −
norm(obl(AX, RX), T), norm(forb(AY, RY), T),
countAs(ev(A, V1, .., Vn), ev(AX, VX1, ..., VXn), InstX),
countAs(ev(A, V1, .., Vn), ev(AY, VY1, ..., VYn), InstY),
collectiveInstSet(InstX; InstY, T).
Following Definition 10, within a collective institution set, it is supposed that there
is a permission(obligation) regarding an action AX performed by an agent enacting
role RX at time T in one institution, and there is also a prohibition regarding action
RY performed by an agent enacting role RY at the same time in another institution,
if the institutional events associated with action AX and AY can be traced back to the
same external event (i.e. including the same action and agent), a weak(strong) conflict
is detected. We define two literals for weak and strong conflicts, weakConflict and
strongConflict. Of these two literals, the first two arguments refer to the action and
role to which the conflicts are related, and the third arguments indicate the two conflict-
ing institutions. The literal countAs maps external events to institutional events, includ-
ing actions and other contextual dimensions carried with them. collectiveInstSet
constrains that the institutions are in the same collective institution set, which can be
computed by the ASP programs proposed in Section 6.2.
(ta, abf)
strongConflict(obl(inLeave, carr, inst3), forb(inPass, carr, inst1), 5)
strongConflict(obl(inLeave, carr, inst3), forb(inPass, carr, inst2), 5)
strongConflict(obl(inInspect, foodAuth, inst1), forb(inInspect, foodAuth, inst2), 6)
weakConflict(perm(inChooseLoc, carr, inst2), forb(inChooseLoc, carr, inst1), 3)
(ta, nabf) strongConflict(obl(inLeave, carr, inst3), forb(inPass, carr, inst1), 4)
(wa, abf) strongConflict(obl(inInspect, foodAuth, inst1), forb(inInspect, foodAuth, inst2), 6)
(tb, nabf) none
Table 2. Norm Conflicts in the case study
Figure 4 shows a part of institutional evolutions in our case study. In general, when
an external event occurs(denoted as the literals above/below arrows), the first task is
to identify which institutions have governance competence, and then identify which
norms in these institutions are triggered. It can be seen that at different time instants,
there are different sets of institutions that are initiated concerning the occurrence of
the event characterized by the attached contextual information. Each circle represents
institutional states at a specific time, and a column of institution Ii above/below the
circle indicates the collective institutions set at the time. For example, for the states Σ3
and Σ′3, the activation of I3 depends on whether the location informed for inspection is
within the governance scope of I3, i.e., the terminal ta. Therefore, I3 is not activated
at Σ′3 when the informed location is tb. While more than one institutions are activated,
different sets of regulative norms from different institutions are triggered to constrain
the behavior, which might cause conflicts. For example, three norms from the three in-
stitutions are triggered simultaneously atΣ5, between which two strong conflicts occur.
In this case study, there are in total five pairs of strong conflicts(indicated by a line with
a cross) and one weak conflict (indicated by a line with a bullet) by providing four d-
ifferent event traces. Details about these conflicts are listed in Table 2. For example,
a strong conflict is detected at time 5 between an obligation of the institutional event
inLeave and a prohibition of the institutional event inPass because these two insti-
tutional events can be traced back to the same external event trans with regard to the



































































































Fig. 4. Collective institution set and norm conflicts.
7 An Overview of Conflict Resolution
When the potential for norm conflict between the institutions of a collective are de-
tected, an effective method of either preventing their actual occurrence, or a way of
resolving those conflicts is needed. Unlike the approaches put forward in the literature
[16, 6] in which the less important norm in a conflict pair is ignored or deleted, we take a
finer-grain approach by revising the less important norm to be consistent with the other.
We believe that such approach can actually resolve the conflicts by tracking and fixing
the origins of them, rather than simply avoiding them. This approach to conflict resolu-
tion has been successfully applied to legal conflicts between cooperating legal systems
[10] and because of the similarity, at the technical level, to the circumstances described
here, we believe the same solution may be applied, perhaps save some minor details. By
viewing each institution in a collective set (i.e. with overlapping governance scopes) as
a participating legal specification – to use the terminology of our earlier work [10] – the
procedure is able to compute automatically all possible revisions of the existing norms
in the light of the detected conflicts. In order to keep this paper self-contained, we pro-
vide a brief introduction to the conflict resolution approach, but for more details of the
approach, please refer to [10].
The approach uses the symbolic machine learning technique Inductive Logic Pro-
gramming, through which the system is able to learn new norms or revisions to existing
norms by generalising the given positive and negative examples. Those provided exam-
ples are the concrete reflection of the desirable and undesirable properties the resulting
institutions should satisfy. Here we synthesize the negative examples by using the find-
ings (i.e. conflict traces and conflicts) from conflict detection and feed them to the ILP
learning system. We assume there is a strict total precedence order over the institu-
tions in a (virtual) organization, e.g. EU  NL  TE,1 which is then used to label the
institutions in a given conflict pair, so that the one with lower precedence is referred
to as the revisable institution and the other as the background institution. Keeping the
background institution unchanged, the ILP learning system computes all possible revi-
sions to the revisable institution that satisfy the properties of the examples, i.e. absence
of conflict. Subsequently, it is necessary to select one of the proposed revision plans,
for which criterion we use the plan with the minimum number of changes, in order to
minimize the differences betwen the revised institution and the original. Each possible
revision suggests a set of change operations, comprising:
– adding a new body condition to an existing norm, or
– removing a body condition from an existing norm, or
– forming a completely new norm.
The revision procedure, to which we refer above, is implemented in ASP, making
it fully compatible with our modelling language for institutions and conflict detection.
Given the operational models of the revisable institutions, we can construct the search
space of all possible revisions with the help of mode declarations [4]. Consequently, an
answer set solver (we use CLINGO), can generate a set of answer sets from: (i) the op-
erational model of the background institution, using (ii) negative examples (i.e. conflict
traces and conflicts) as constraints, and the (iii) revisable institutions. Each answer set is
a candidate revision. We assign costs to each operation – the default is the unit cost for
addition or deletion – and hence the total cost of a revision is then the number of opera-
tions included in the revision. The final step uses the aggregate technique in CLINGO to
select the answer set with minimum cost. Following the application of the revision de-
scribed in the answer set, the revised institution no longer causes the conflicts described
in the learning examples.
8 Related Work
Interest has been steadily growing in the use of norms to regulate and coordinate agent
behaviour in MAS, as a result of progress in two complementary areas: (i) institutional
modeling, and (ii) norm conflict detection.
1 EU, NL and TE refer to the three institutions in the case study: EU being European Union, NL
the Netherlands and TE the terminal and warehouse.
We first review some representative research on normative modelling. Singh propos-
es the use of commitments to capture normative concepts in MAS and defines norms
as a tuple of subject, object, context, antecedent and consequent [14], which provides
an intuitive way to characterize the bounds of autonomy and interdependence between
agents. Boella and van der Torre presented a logic architecture for a normative system
and study logic relations between counts-as conditionals, institutional constraints, obli-
gations and permissions [2]. This architecture gives a clear vision of how input/output
operations correspond to the functionality of components that constitute normative sys-
tems. However, both of these studies are at the level of norms, while in contrast our
work considers a set of institutions, each of which defines a set of norms, and their
interrelations in the setting of virtual organizations.
We introduce the notion of governance scope and demonstrate how governance s-
cope functions in institution modeling and conflict detection. The ideas presented in [16,
5] have some similarities. Vasconcelos et al.[16] define the influence scope of norms to
constrain the effects of individual norms. This contrasts with our approach, where gov-
ernance scope is defined at the level of institutions, with the aim of illustrating how
multiple institutions can be situated within a virtual organization and how institutions
are activated when responding to observed events. Elhag et al. [5] informally proposes
the concept “world knowledge” that describes the context in which norms are intend-
ed to apply, along with the definition of key terminological concepts. The governance
scope and constitutive norms defined in our work can capture the same concepts, but
more importantly, governance scope is modeled explicitly and is operationalized in in-
stitutional reasoning.
We now turn to existing work on norm conflicts. Vasconcelos et al. [15, 16] con-
sider both the detection and resolution of norm conflicts. They present an algorithm
that uses first-order unification to determine substitutions, called undesirable sets, for
the variables of norms that would lead to norm conflicts. Once the values are identi-
fied, conflicts can be avoided, by not allowing those values. In contrast, the conflict
detection mechanism presented here is not only operationalized, but significantly, deals
with conflicts that emerge through the interaction of institutions, which goes beyond the
static analysis of individual norms. Using ideas similar to those in [15, 16], the practical
reasoning agents of [9] include resolution mechanisms that enable them to handle con-
flicting norms themselves via negotiation with a norm issuer. An alternative resolution
approach is proposed by Garcı´a-Camino et. al [6], in which a simple priority mechanism
is used to rank norms and hence resolve conflict by discarding lower priority norms.
9 Conclusions
Targeting virtual organizations, this paper presents a full illustration of what an institu-
tion consists of and how it evolves to the changes of reality. By explicitly incorporating
the concept of governance scope, we know that an institution is not only a set of norms
that are used to regulate the real world behavior, but is also characterized by the control
boundary that determines what kinds of events are in the competence of the institution.
Furthermore, the operational model provides a computational expression of institution
dynamics, i.e., how institutions respond to the occurrence of external events.
The contributions of this paper are three-fold. First, governance scope is explicit-
ly captured by institutions through context models, which facilitates the identification
of applicable institutions in virtual organizations. Second, the relations between insti-
tutions are studied from the perspective of governance overlap. Third, based on our
institution model, two definitions of strong and weak norm conflicts are proposed to
the specific requirements of virtual organizations. To validate our proposal, we present
an operational model, which enables an implementation of detecting strong and weak
norm conflicts by a case study.
In this paper, we propose a framework for modelling institutions and their gov-
ernance scopes. The framework not only provides the components for capturing the
regulative properties of institutions but also their constitutive nature. Moreover, by ex-
plicitly modelling the governance scope of institutions, the framework enables a clear
representation of the regulation boundaries of multiple institutions, which is an essential
aspect that has to be considered for conflicts detection. Though the framework intends
to provide a general approach for the problem undertaken, there are several issues that
have to be considered when applying the framework:
– We assume that the ontologies used for contextualizing different institutions are
aligned. That is, the contextual information is shared among different institutions.
If this is not the case, additional work concerning ontology alignment needs to be
done, which is itself a separate research topic.
– Sometimes, the governance scope of an institution is implicit and has to be derived
from the description of its norms. In this case, one needs an overview understanding
of the institution and generalize the contextual dimensions of its regulation bound-
aries.
– The conflict detection mechanism is dependant on the aligned semantics among
institutions, i.e. the same entity has to be represented by the same logic notation in
different institutions.
In future work, we intend to extend the institution model to multiple levels through
hierarchical context models, and study how institutions are related from abstract to con-
crete. Furthermore, we will make refinement on different kinds of regulative norms and
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